

TAPE: DCI-51
START: 0 - 1 1/4
SIDE: A

23 APR 1979

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final.
23 apr 79

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

Further to my brief handwritten notes over the weekend on the
SALT testimony -

a. I think our index of the Treaty itself that goes on
the upper-half of the cardboard folder should be divided into
three categories of quantities, characteristics and ban/prohibitions,
and arranged so that those three categories underlap and ^{are} ~~are~~
indexed.

b. I think the basic change that needs to be made in the
presentation of the material about our confidence factors is
to key it to the score card. I literally think we must walk
people through the score card ~~line-by-line, I mean~~ column by column.
Otherwise I will be saying one thing and they will be looking at
these columns and asking other things. They should count on my
going through each column so they don't get tempted to interrupt
and jump around. We will need to do this not only for the items
we present but for every item of the Treaty; that is, I would
like to have an explanation for each item of the Treaty in
presentational form.

c. I am concerned that not all the items of the Treaty
actually appear in the scorecard. I recognize our difficult
problems of aggregating items such as launch-weight and throw-weight.
My attempt to revise the outline for that was really to get the
items of the Treaty forward.

If we did this and then add an additional column that
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
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showed the numerical provision of the Treaty, I think we might avoid some confusion of people not being able to find in the scorecard particular items they are concerned with in the Treaty. This also is another reason to index the scorecard against the Treaty.

d2. I am concerned with Bob Bowie's point that making the distinction between monitoring and verification is going to sound like we are trying to evade the issue. It seems to me making the distinction between verification and the adequacy of verification on the one hand, and the verifiability of individual items of the Treaty and the verifiability of the treaty overall gives us adequate protection against getting into the realm of judgments. What do you think?

e3. Finally, I think there needs to be a wrap-up section that does try to summarize the overall picture as best we can, ^{it} but doesn't make an overall judgment, but it points out the various areas of low confidence against cheating and whether the results would be low or high, etc.




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Nobody really cares much about launch weight and throw weight, per se.

I think we will have to elaborate more on this issue.

cc:



I would also like to see, as soon as possible, whatever endorsement there was from the SCC(NSC) of the idea of making a distinction between monitoring and verification.

Would you also let me see the Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendment of 1977 which apparently stipulates that ACDA is responsible for verification.

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